This document aims to clarify what has come out of COP261 and which elements are most relevant for the climate justice movement, global justice organisations and society in general. It is an attempt to distil and translate the high technical complexity of the climate negotiations into arguments which can be understood from a political perspective.

Please feel free to contact us with your questions, queries, clarifications, suggestions etc. at
observatori@odg.cat, with [COP26] in the subject line.

The Glasgow Summit: general overview

The UNFCCC has collated all the results of COP26 here.

The twenty-sixth conference of the UNFCCC signatories, COP26 was to be the great summit which would
give direction to the momentum from the Paris Agreement and ensure that the world does not go beyond
an average global temperature increase of 1.5ºC.

It is worth pointing out that circumstances were not ideal. The summit was preceded by COP25 which
finally took place in Spain after being turned down by both Brazil and Chile. The Madrid COP left a lot of
work to be done and the global impacts of the pandemic required the 2020 conference to be suspended.
This paralysis is evident in the scant progress made in the lead-up to Glasgow.

That said, we can say that COP26 had its winners and losers.

On one hand, the winners:

1. With the COP Presidency, the UK can be moderately satisfied that an agreement was reached on a
Rulebook for the Paris Agreement, including Article 6 on markets. COP26 was also part of its
strategy to position itself on the global stage after Brexit.

2. The USA is again looking to take a leadership role in a multilateral context, marking the end
of Trumpism. Therefore, it was very present in the negotiations and reached a surprising bilateral
agreement with China (see section 3.8 of this document for more information) .

3. The EU took on a prominent role on the subject of energy, defending the abandonment of fossil
fuels and declaring itself to be the guarantor of the end of coal (despite promoting natural gas).

The losers were the impoverished countries:

1. India’s last move in the closing plenary (supported by China and others) to change the agreement
on coal from a “phase-out” to a “phase-down”, puts the 1.5ºC scenario and therefore the survival
of the island states of the AOSIS , group (and others ) at risk.

2. The North-to-South transfer pledge of $100 billion annually has been reissued for 2025 (instead of
2020), although it is claimed that the 40% for adaptation finance will be reached in 2025.

3. The loss and damage which many countries are suffering due to climate change was recognised,
but funding was not made available for mechanisms to tackle it, blocked by the EU and the USA.

The post What came out of COP26? appeared first on ODG.

Brazil is a strategic player in the global green transition. It currently produces 92% of the world’s niobium, a mineral classified as critical by the European Union (EU), and is estimated to hold around 23% of global rare earth reserves. With substantial renewable energy output, primarily from hydroelectric power plants, the country is also well positioned to become a major producer and exporter of green hydrogen, drawing interest from EU institutions. Furthermore, the Brazilian government has expressed support for carbon markets as an opportunity to secure funding, despite their questionable effectiveness in actually reducing emissions.

The 1992 Rio Convention saw the adoption of the United Nations Framework  Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC secretariat is responsible for convening the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). Brazil holds the presidency of COP30 this year and has chosen Belém do Pará as the host city. Belém is located in the heart of the Amazon rainforest, one of the most biodiverse regions on the planet, though scarred by centuries of extractivism and deforestation. Under the leadership of President Lula da Silva, Brazil is seeking to set itself apart from previous COP presidencies and showcase its climate ambitions, even as it continues to back new oil extraction projects within its borders. For example, the government has recently applied for the country to join the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+). After three consecutive years of COPs hosted by authoritarian, oil-producing nations with significant restrictions on civil society, this year’s summit is expected to take place in a very different context, characterised by widespread social mobilisation.

This article examines two core aspects of Brazil’s green transition policy in terms of foreign interests in the country: rare earth mining and green hydrogen production.

Rare earths are rapidly becoming a focal point of global geopolitical competition, due to their vital role in manufacturing numerous technologies linked to the green transition, digitalisation and the defence industry. The term refers to 17 elements in the periodic table that are grouped together because they share similar magnetic and conductive properties. Contrary to what their name might suggest, they are actually quite abundant. The adjective “rare” instead reflects the difficulty of obtaining them in a pure state, since complex chemical processes are required to separate them from the gangue. Originally used on a large scale for industrial lighting, rare earths now have a vast range of applications and are found in most of the technologies we rely on every day. When added in small quantities to other materials, they can produce unique effects and even substitute critical minerals in the production of specific technologies. Digital devices such as mobile phones, hard drives and fibre-optic cables depend on rare earths to function. They are also essential components in certain “green” technologies, including wind turbines, electric vehicles and some solar panels. At the same time, rare earths remain crucial to the fossil fuel industry.

They are used in the manufacture of combustion vehicles and in oil refining, as well as in military technologies such as drones, missiles and “smart” bombs. In light of the above, demand for these elements is expected to rise exponentially in the coming
years, and control over their supply will bring both political and economic power.

For its part, hydrogen is an energy carrier used in a range of industrial processes, particularly in oil refining and the production of chemical fertilisers. Decarbonising these sectors involves replacing grey hydrogen, produced from fossil gas, with green hydrogen obtained by splitting water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen using renewably sourced electricity. The fossil fuel industry is among the main stakeholders supporting the development of the global green hydrogen market, as it helps to sustain a centralised energy model built around large-scale, corporate-led projects. Agribusinesses, similarly, could use this transition to maintain their
own large-scale industrial food production model. Other industrial sectors, such as steelmaking and metallurgy, also use hydrogen in their production processes. Their importance is expected to grow as renewable technologies become the driving force behind the energy transition.

The post Brazil’s green transition beyond COP30 appeared first on ODG.

COP30 began on 10 November, as the third decade of these United Nations summits to tackle the climate emergency is being launched. The ODG will monitor it in person, to inform about what is happening at the Conference of the Parties and we will also participate in the Counter Conference. Governments around the world meet at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) in Belém, Brazil. Within the analysis of COPs, in previous editions we already detected that false solutions are being promoted, which do not address the root causes of climate change. With the publication of this report, we continue monitoring global decision-making spaces, which should be key to addressing the multi-crisis scenario in which we live, but that have previously ended up making insufficient or directly useless proposals to make a just transition a reality. 

In this report, we take three examples from the current COP30 negotiations of ineffective mechanisms to overcome the many challenges we face. We describe these as “false solutions” because they neither solve the climate crisis nor offer the structural change necessary to reduce inequalities. Investigating Madagascar as a flagship case, we unmask debt swaps and carbon markets. Both policies are presented as climate solutions by the Malagasy and Spanish governments, and this vision has the full support of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, they mainly benefit rich countries and corporations, and do not contribute to generating the systemic change essential to face the climate emergency.

We also argue that a fair transition mechanism valid at COP30 should include the notion of reparations, recognising ecological, colonial and reproductive debts to the Global South and to women. At COP30, governments should commit to courageous and transformative political climate solutions to overcome multiple challenges and take a step forward towards a fairer world. In the report, we offer proposals to ensure these fair solutions to debt and climate action financing. Despite focusing on the case of Madagascar, this experience can be extrapolated to many other states in the Global South, which suffer from the double violence of the consequences of climate change that they have not caused, and an over-indebtedness that adds to the continued plunder of colonialism, racism and extractivism.

This is not the first time we have researched how the climate emergency and false solutions impact Madagascar. Recently, we have also collaborated with CRAAD-OI to do a fieldwork on rare earth mining on the island, and how it affects the local population, and ecosystems.

Some of the policy recommendations for ecofeminist climate action included in the report:

1. Facing the debt and climate debt crisis
   1. The countries of the Global North must undertake to recognise and record their historical and ecological debts and offer compensation mechanisms to countries, such as Madagascar, which suffer losses and damage as a result of the climate crisis.
2. A new fair, equitable and adequate financial objective
   1. Adaptation financing commitments must meet adaptation needs, which are expected to exceed $30 billion per year by 2030.
   2. The funds must come from the countries of the Global North, in accordance with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capacities, as well as the principle of the polluter pays.
3. Support a just transition
   1. Just transition plans should recognise care work as an essential requirement for transforming societies into low-emission economies, and should include policies to eliminate existing gender inequalities.
   2. The measures taken at COP30 must not harm the fundamental rights or livelihoods of communities in the Global South. Lands—including the territories of indigenous peoples, agricultural land and forests—must be excluded from Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.
4. Repairs: vindicate climate, colonial and reproductive debts for fair climate policies
   1. Recognise climate debt – defined as the historical and moral responsibility of those who have caused the climate crisis – to implement repairs and compensate for the damage caused to the affected countries and peoples.
   2. Recognise reproductive debts, taking into account the intergenerational, care, cultural and social costs derived from the climate crisis, mostly invisible and supported by women. Spaces such as COP30 should be spaces for recognising these outstanding debts

The multiple challenges of COP30

The current climate negotiations take place in a deteriorating multilateral situation. International conflicts and militarisation are intensifying, and the two years of genocide in Gaza show the Global North’s unwillingness to defend the human rights of all. In addition, right-wing and far-right governments – such as the current Trump administration in the US – block and delegitimise multilateral decision-making spaces such as the COP, thereby hampering democratic global governance. Although the US delegation is not expected to attend the COP30 in Belém, it will influence negotiations from outside and will continue to compete with the second world economy, China, as it has already done in previous COPs. Apart from the many political challenges, we are facing fundamental structural challenges. The climate emergency is most devastating with each passing year, and threatens the livelihoods of billions of people and species — especially in the Global South.

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This publication was co-funded by the European Union and the Barcelona City Council. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders.

This publication is part of the European campaign #EraOfJustice, that we are promoting in coalition with dozens of organisations that promote climate justice, debt justice, and ecofeminism.

The post Ecofeminist proposals for climate action – The case of Madagascar appeared first on ODG.

From 30 June to 3 July 2025 will take place the 4th United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) bringing together governments from around the world to discuss structural reforms in global economic and financial governance. For the first time, it will be held in a country in the Global North, Spain, in the city of Seville. In this document, we provide a brief introduction to the United Nations Financing for Development process, and then focus on the interconnection1 between specific issues of debt, austerity, climate, tax and corporate-financial power from a feminist and decolonial perspective. Lastly, we explain the options available to all those seeking to get involved in events surrounding the FfD4 Conference in Seville.

 What is the United Nations Financing for Development (FfD) process?

The United Nations (UN), as the only global institution in which all countries have an equal voice, is a space where demands such as those for the democratisation of global economic governance and systemic change in global financial architecture are placed on the agenda. Debates and negotiations on economic and financial reform are held as part of the Financing for Development (FfD) process, with regular meetings and major international conferences that take place every six to ten years.

Financing for development has a long history and arises from the grievances voiced in the countries of the Global South regarding the systemic shortcomings and injustices in the international financial architecture. Although international economic cooperation is part of the UN’s mandate, it has been systematically marginalised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), in which the countries of the Global North have a greater proportion of votes, as well as by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – of which said countries have exclusive membership – and the G20. FfD involves governments, multilateral organisations, civil society and the private sector. Civil society is represented by the Civil Society Financing for Development Mechanism, a working group which has been active since 2008 and which brings together several hundred organisations and networks from around the world dedicated to encouraging civil society participation in the formal UN FfD process and other related spheres.

Why is the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) important?

Reforms covering debt, fiscal policy, private finance, international business and trade, international development cooperation, science and technology, as well as systemic issues such as the reform of the governance of the international financial system, will be part of the official negotiations agenda at the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development. There is both hope and expectation on the part of international civil society, engaged in advocacy in official UN spaces, that the FfD4 Conference will provide significant political momentum towards urgent structural reforms. As part of the process of preparing for the FfD4 Conference, international civil society has produced hundreds of proposals for the FfD4 Elements paper, Zero Draft, and First Draft. For example, this position document by Spanish civil society organizations, and these contributions by the Civil Society FfD Mechanism to the Draft of the FfD4 Outcome Document.

The FfD4 Conference in Seville also stands as a critical juncture for building global networks. Some days prior (exact dates to be confirmed), the Social Forum of the Conference will be held. This is a meeting space for international civil society organisations fighting for the reduction of structural inequalities and for global economic justice, among other causes. The Seville Conference is gaining in importance on the agendas of organisations, groups and movements that do not typically focus their efforts on international financial system reform, but who nevertheless consider current economic governance to be the root of the present polycrisis (which includes the environmental crisis, the climate emergency, loss of biodiversity, the crisis of care, increasing inequalities between countries and social classes, the rise of the extreme right, loss of collective rights, etc.). The Seville Conference has the clear potential to be both a locus and a moment of hope, especially for stakeholders from the Global South and those involved in climate justice and feminist movements, women’s rights organisations and trade union federations who, through the Civil Society Mechanism, will have a collective voice on a global economic-financial stage.

The FfD4 Conference also opens up a pathway in terms of media and communications, offering an opportunity to highlight global economic and financial issues, as well as the faces and stories of those affected both in the Global South and within Spain itself. It is a chance to discuss the structural causes and propose the solutions required to deal with the polycrisis as a matter of global justice. As part of this push, we will delve into five interconnected themes that can help us to enrich the public conversation before, during and beyond the FfD4 Conference: debt and austerity; climate emergency and debt; tax justice and climate funding; international cooperation for development; feminist financing; and ecofeminist transformations.

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This publication was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The post Five key themes connecting debt, climate and feminism at the FfD4 Conference appeared first on ODG.

Article by Laura Heckmann, as an abstract to her Master’s Thesis.

How do ecofeminist and feminist actors push for change at the COP? This question arose from my general quest for strategies for change and resilience in the world we live in, that is undoubtedly cruel and challenging for those calling for system change. Taking the recent COP29 as a point of departure, I spoke with eight activists, scholars, and advocates for feminism, ecological and economic justice about the challenges of navigating and pushing for progressive changes in a space such as the COP. The subsequent research piece reflects on my conversations with them in order to show the diversity in strategies in navigating this space. I hope that these reflections can offer insights to others that want to learn from more experienced ecofeminists and feminists on how to push for change whilst creating empowering alliances with others. In the end, the COP is just one example of the capitalist, colonial and patriarchal spaces that we encounter every day, thus we might take these insights as an inspiration to take the question a step further by asking: How can we work towards change anywhere in an (eco)feminist manner?

DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE

The following paragraphs do not do justice to the impressive individuals that I had the chance of interviewing, but it will give a first insight into the diverse (eco)feminist agendas, strategies, solidarity and perspectives of eight people that have engaged in these interconnected struggles for the past decades.

From the 11 of November 2024, the city of Baku in Azerbaijan hosted the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference. On a yearly basis, the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) brings together almost every country to debate commitments and strategies to tackle the climate crisis. However, CSOs and many climate-vulnerable nations criticize annually that the solutions proposed by the COP do not reflect the needs of climate vulnerable countries and citizens and neither the urgency of the climate and related crises. Also, last year, at COP29, the inability and unwillingness of enriched Global North countries to take sufficient action and acknowledge their responsibility was striking, and ultimately failed to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable nations in facing the climate crisis and ignoring the gendered impact of the latter. What was promised to be the “Finance COP” (ODG COP29), turned into a “Betrayal in Baku”.

Next to other issues, COP29 had as major goal to reach an agreement on climate finance, including the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). After two weeks of debates, countries agreed on a new climate finance target of $300 billion annually by 2035. However, not only the quantity is devastatingly low in comparison to the (minimum of) $5 to $6.9 trillion which climate vulnerable countries are estimated to need between now and 2030, also the quality of funding is vaguely expressed and mostly based on debt-issuing loans by private finance and multilateral development banks (MDBs) through which enriched countries evaded their responsibility to pay up. The final decision on the NCQG does in no way reflect the needs of the climate vulnerable countries and thus is rejected by different countries (amongst which Cuba, India, Bolivia, and Nigeria) and the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.

Apart from the disappointing outcomes with regard to climate finance, COP29 was contextualised in the geopolitical context of the ongoing genocide in Palestine, the war in Ukraine, and the recent election of Donald Trump whose potential withdrawal from the UNFCCC pushed countries into accepting whatever deal before Trump’s inauguration. Lastly, the host of the COP, Azerbaijan, made progressive climate finance decisions more difficult as its national economy depends largely on the extraction and export of hydrocarbons like oil and natural gas (ODG COP29). At least 1773 fossil fuel lobbyists have been granted access to COP29, a number that outscores “all the delegates from the 10 most climate vulnerable nations combined (1033)” (Kick Big Polluters Out 2024). A positive outcome next to the mentioned shortcomings was the successful 10-year prolongation of the Lima Work Programme on Gender. The implementation of next steps will be at stake at COP30, and without sufficient climate finance, effective gender-transformative climate action will remain challenging to implement. Next to the disappointing outcomes, the possibilities for civil society participation to protest and denounce the wrong-doings of the COP were severely restricted and silenced at COP29.

Given this challenging context, how do ecofeminist and feminist actors experience the space of the COP, and how do they push for the (eco)feminist agenda? To answer this question, I spoke with:

• Anna Pérez Català, Senior Research Fellow at IDDRI
• Bruna Cañada Roca, former financial justice researcher at the Debt Observatory in Globalization (ODG)
• Clàudia Custodio Martínez, energy and climate researcher at the Debt Observatory in Globalization (ODG)
• Shamim Wasii Nyanda, member of Debt for Climate Global and lead of Debt for Climate Tanzania chapter
• Shereen Talaat, founder and director of MENA Fem Movement For Economic, Development And Ecological Justice
• Sofía Fernández, member of Friday for Future Spain and Ecologistas en Acción
• And two anonymous sources

Looking Forward to COP30 and Beyond

COP30 in Brazil is seen as a crucial moment, as it coincides with key global milestones such as being half-way to the 2030 Agenda and the jubilee year calling for debt cancellation. Preparing for COP30, feminist and ecofeminist actors continue to fight for systemic transformation, engaging in the COP as just one space in the broader struggle for a just, (eco)feminist and sustainable world.

This article highlights that while COP is a highly challenging space, the collective work of feminist and ecofeminist activists is vital in holding people in power accountable, reclaiming space and pushing for systemic change that addresses the urgency of the climate crises as well as systemic injustices.

This article was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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As the climate crisis accelerates, the green transition has become something of a catchphrase. At the same time, polarisation is rising along with the advancement of digital capitalism, and securitization is back on the agendas of the world powers. In this context, and in a world with finite resources, control of raw materials is key. This report arises from the perceived need to shed light on both who stands to benefit and who pays the price of the new rush for raw materials, and the global dynamics accelerating these processes in the name of the transition to a “green” and low-carbon world.

It aims to build upon previous work by the Debt Observatory in Globalisation (ODG) in producing a critical analysis of the energy transition and its corporate capture (for instance, lithium mining in Chile and Argentinai), as well as work carried out with international allies under the umbrella of the Rare Earth Elements Group. This research falls under the framework of the Critical Minerals Observatory, cocreated by the ODG as members of ENCO. 

“it is a fake narrative, when they say that the energy transition is the perfect world, because someone, somewhere, have to pay for it with their life and their blood”.

In July 2024, two members of ODG travelled to Madagascar on a fact-finding mission to deepen understanding of the experiences of communities on the front line of potential Rare Earths mining projects in the country. This fieldwork was done in collaboration with (and would not have been possible without) the local organisation CRAAD-OI (Research and Support Centre for Development Alternatives – Indian Ocean). The information contained in this report is based on more than 18 interviews with communities, traditional leaders, activists and researchers from the country

In the first section, we outline the global reality of Rare Earth Elements (REE) in the context of the so-called “green” transition and the factors lying behind the new push for raw materials. The following section centres on the territories bearing the burden of rare earth extraction in Madagascar, elucidating on how the quest for REE is impacting local peoples and emerging forms of resistance. Thereafter, common patterns are identified in the three cases studied. In section four, the transnational companies behind the projects are identified. The development of resistance against the mining projects is explained in section five. Lastly, the report closes with a number of final reflections.

This report aims to contribute to the conversation about what a truly just global socio-ecological transition could look like. It shines a spotlight on the contradictions of a system that purportedly strives to bring down emissions without tackling global inequalities. What interests lie behind this new rush for raw materials? Is it the planet, or capitalism on a new stage?

The publication is available in Catalan, Spanish, English, French, and Malagasy.

‘Land for living’. Short documentary

In addition to the report, the research team has also produced a short documentary, in collaboration with the audiovisual cooperative Bruna. ‘Land for living’ (‘Les terres, per viure’, 2025) portrays some of the voices collected during the fieldwork from the north to the south of the island of Madagascar. It follows the impacts of the Rare-Earths minining, and visibilizes the resistance of local communities. In Madagascar, there is currently an existing Rare-Earths mine, in Tolagnaro, and two inactive projects, in Toliara and in the Ampasindava peninsula.

The short film is available in Malagasy, with Catalan, Spanish, English and French subtitles.

Media collaboration with Cuellilargo to explain what is going on with Rare Earths

Just as we did on the episode 28th of our podcast ‘Desenredades’, we have tried new formats to disseminate the results of our research. You can find the key points compiled in this collaborative video with Cuellilargo, a Catalan collective who promote critical journalism.

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This publication was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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A year ago, we began a process of reflection on the possibility of mutual influence between Degrowth and (eco)feminism, to build bridges and broaden perspectives, in which more than 30 activists and researchers participated. We had feminist and queer activists, defenders of the territory of Latin America and Spain, ecological and decolonial researchers, feminist economists, cooperativists… with very diverse perspectives on Degrowth, but all interested in the possibility of articulating joint critiques and alternatives to the capitalist system.

Can Degrowth be an ecofeminist alternative? This is the question with which we launched the conversations, which have led us to imagine a synthesis of both currents (Degrowth and ecofeminism) to propose new ways of inhabiting and reorganising the world that do not subordinate one crisis to another and that recognise the full diversity of subjects of transformation who are fighting against growth.

We have conceived these pages as a notebook that compiles analyses and debates to help us better situate ourselves when reflecting on alternatives and how to promote them. We are aware that analysing the crises of the system in all their complexity, as well as building bridges between different forms of activism, can sometimes overwhelm us. That is why we believe it is useful to make proposals for synthesis that (without being exhaustive) help us to situate ourselves. It also helps us to recover genealogies, remember where we come from, and not start from scratch every time.

Furthermore, we hope that this publication will help us gauge ecofeminist perspectives and thus identify whether a campaign, a demand, an alliance, or a specific action would fit into a process of transformation that leads us towards ecofeminist Degrowth. Above all, taking into account the importance of weaving alternatives from comprehensive perspectives, which also incorporate decoloniality, criticism of heteronormativity, rural perspectives, etc.

Specifically, you will find, among other things, a commitment to implementing eight ecofeminist principles that summarise much of the debate that has taken place so far. In addition to an approach to some strategic debates, such as the construction of ecofeminist narratives that can reconnect us with the possibility of achieving other presents and futures, far removed from the increasingly prevalent denialist, racist and anti-feminist perspectives.

The post Self-edited Book | Ecofeminist Degrowth. Slowing Down To Restore Life appeared first on ODG.

The new report “The wheel of corporate fortune: How the EIB boosts profits in the name of competitiveness”, from Counter Balance, Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG), Observatoire des Multinationales, and Gresea,, reveals how 7 top corporate clients of the European Investment Bank (EIB) —Iberdrola, Stellantis, Intesa Sanpaolo, Leonardo, Orange, Northvolt and the Gavi Alliance— receive billions in public loans despite significant profits and troubling social and environmental records.

Since 2020, these 7 companies have collectively earned €100 billion in profits, an amount exceeding half of the EU’s annual social infrastructure needs. Over €11 billion in EIB loans has bolstered these businesses, which have since distributed €38.7 billion to shareholders, spent €11.9 billion on share buybacks, and paid CEOs €146.7 million.

Iberdrola received €3.5 billion from the EIB since 2020 while reporting profits of €16.6 billion between 2020 and 2023. In the same period, the company has disbursed €4.7 billion of dividends to its shareholders and €25.2 million to its CEO in salaries and bonus. At the same time, Iberdrola is linked to 13 socio-environmental conflicts in Central America, Brazil, and Europe, primarily due to large-scale projects with significant ecological and social impacts.

One of them is the largest European solar plant in Spain financed by the EIB, which did not deliver promised local jobs, illegally expropriated the main landowner and is being investigated for fraud by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, Iberdrola received over €919 million in public money from Spanish governmental institutions between 2020 and 2023. €899 million of this amount consists of non-exchange grants from central, regional and municipal Spanish administrations, €8.8 million are loans, €11.4 million financial guarantees and €1.019,33 tax advantages.

The EIB’s financing of large corporations and private financial institutions has steadily increased as it becomes a central EU institution to enhance competitiveness in strategic sectors. The report highlights a concerning trend: public funds are being used to make projects even more lucrative for companies capable of self-financing, many of which have harmful social and environmental impacts, face fraud investigations, or supply weapons to countries violating international law. Evidence shows that the Bank prioritises boosting profits over social and environmental benefits, which divert resources from investments that serve the public good. 

Instead of channelling billions to subsidise profits of large companies, the EIB should become a public bank supporting a truly public mandate. To do so, the EIB should:

• Finance projects and companies that serve social and environmental needs
• Work with public entities not driven by profit
• Improve its standards to ensure finance for sustainable projects that respect human rights and the environment
• Introduce key social, economic and environmental conditions for companies and financial institutions benefitting from the EIB’s finance

READ THE FULL REPORT HERE

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Debt and deforestation are important issues with significant ecological, social, and political resonance; they are recognised by social movements and academics around the world. However, the connection between them is understudied and undertheorised. This study presents a mixed-method case study based on semi-structured interviews and extensive desk-based research. Seven mechanisms are described through which Colombia’s public external debt drives the destruction of the Colombian Amazon; two are direct – including debt-based investment in roads – and five are indirect.

It is established that a vicious cycle between public external debt and deforestation exists in the Colombian Amazon. It is also argued that public external debt should be considered a piece of ‘colonial debris’ which the Colombian state has to transcend to stop the region’s destruction. In its praxis and research proposals, this study presents a call to academia to embrace scholar-activism. You can read the full report here.

There are many reasons to push for total unconditional debt cancellation – from the struggle against patriarchy (Yahaya, 2021), to that for self-determination (Jubilee South Manifesto, 1998), to that for reparations in the context of ecological and colonial debts (Pacto Ecosocial e Intercultural del Sur, 2023) – but stopping deforestation is rarely cited as one of them.

This is because the connection between debt and deforestation, one of the primary issues facing the Amazon biome, is understudied and undertheorised. The extensive literature on deforestation regularly fails to explore function of debt (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2023), while the extensive literature on debt is – although fairly well linked with fossil fuels (Woolfenden, 2023b) and social issues (Kentikelenis & Stubbs, 2023) – rarely connected to deforestation. Thus, there is an important gap in understanding which, given the strategic context and objectives of social movements over the coming years, would be helpful to fill. In addition, the limited qualitative and quantitative evidence which does exist suggests that this is a connection which merits attention (Cavallero & Gago, 2021; Kahn & McDonald, 1994; Shandra et al., 2008).

Thus, the findings of this work should be of use to stakeholders and political leaders involved in debt activism, of interest to scholars of deforestation, and of importance to broader social and climate justice activists. It is the author’s hope that the distinction between the categories of activist and scholar dissolves as we struggle together towards liberation from colonial capitalism.

The destruction of non-human nature, especially in tropical forests, is a foundational feature of today’s polycrisis (Jayasuriya, 2023). Debt cancellation is a tangible and achievable objective, aligned with the root causes of that polycrisis and commensurate with its scale. It may seem ambitious, but through activism, we create hope (Loach, 2023).

The briefing is available in Spanish,
English and Portuguese.

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In collaboration with:

This publication was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

With the support of:

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The research is an initiative from the European Network of Corporate Observatories (ENCO), conducted by researchers of Observatori del Deute en la Globalització (ODG), Observatoire des multinationales, Groupe de Recherche pour une Stratégie économique Alternative (GRESEA) and Observatorio de Multinacionales en América Latina (OMAL). This report is an exercise in citizen monitoring of how COVID-19 recovery and the cost-of-living crisis were financed in France, Spain and Belgium during 2020, 2021 and 2022.

Socially necessary sectors such as health care, education and public transport received less than 17% of public financing to face the crisis during 2020, 2021 and 2022 in France, Spain and Belgium. These three countries, chosen as case studies, provided stimulus measures far from 10% of GDP in 2020, 2021 and 2022: 4% at best. Between a third and half of the funding were allocated to private companies. If indirect grants are also accounted for, such as job protection measures or household energy subsidies, they received 69% (France), 68% (Spain) and 58% (Belgium) of public financing. Almost no public funding required climate or gender criteria.

Between 24% and 54% of all funds spent during 2020, 2021 and 2022 in France, Spain and Belgium went to social protection. The majority were job protection measures, directly benefiting only part of the population with regulated labour conditions. The rest of France’s, Spain’s and Belgium’s population (including women doing unpaid care work, young people, migrants or marginalised people in unregulated or informal working conditions) had access to social protection measures that made up only 4% (France), 10% (Spain) and 23% (Belgium) of crisis financing.

Banks have been an important beneficiary of public crisis funding through the channelling and allocation of public funds to the economy, like publicly-guaranteed loans. Their economic benefits and their decision-making power is not sufficiently visible.

Public funding in times of crisis is a political choice, and these policies can deepen existing inequalities if they are not adequately designed and implemented. This report can be a tool for social movements, progressive media and stakeholders providing solid data and arguments for transformative, just and feminist crisis-response policies that can be used in the upcoming political debate regarding the debt, climate and care crisis. 

Any public crisis financing should be based on a collective-rights-oriented and ecologically sustainable pathway which ensures that an adequate level of funding is made available and that these funds are spent equitably, effectively and transparently, primarily for those who are the most impacted by the crisis – namely women, young people and people in a situation of vulnerability. The participation of citizens’ elected representatives and other rights holders in monitoring funding packages and policies is also important in ensuring that crisis-response decisions are not made behind closed doors. 

In this report the call from the People’s Recovery Tracker project is answered, namely the initiative of the Financial Transparency Coalition, the Centre for Budget Governance Accountability (CBGA), Christian Aid, the Tax Justice Network Africa, Latindadd, the Fundación SES, the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANNA) and the Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD), who inspired our work with their “Recovery at a Crossroads: How countries spent COVID-19 funds in the Global South (2022)”, which called for a People’s Recovery at a time of multiple crises.

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In the current context of climate crisis, institutions are promoting the energy transition to reduce CO₂ emissions and, therefore, meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This transition is characterised by the decarbonisation of the economy, which involves the electrification of productive sectors through the implementation of non-conventional renewable energies, photovoltaic and wind, on a large scale.

Not all sectors can be electrified, and this is where green hydrogen comes into play as a necessary and essential element for the energy transition.

Europe, in search of hydrogen across the planet

The European Union aims to become the major hydrogen consumer region by 2030. According to the European Commission, it is estimated that Europe will need 20 million tonnes to meet its decarbonisation needs. Half of this sum is intended to be imported from third countries.

Import agreements are intended to be used to establish new relations or consolidate existing ones with countries in the Global South, reproducing the neo-colonial practices that it has also carried out with fossil fuels. One example is Chile, with whom the EU has modernised the existing trade agreement, including elements required for the green transition, such as hydrogen and critical raw materials.

Public financing is one of the key elements for energy projects because it facilitates their construction and reduces the risks for the private companies which promote them. In the case of the European Union, more than 25 billion euros are available through different financing mechanisms created for hydrogen projects. So far, large energy companies and companies in the sectors where hydrogen will be used have been the main beneficiaries.

Climate, social, territorial and gender impacts on the territory

Currently active hydrogen projects are small-scale or in the pilot phase, which makes it difficult to determine the scope of the impacts linked to large-scale projects. The report has analysed, from an ecofeminist perspective, the climatic, social, territorial and gender impacts that projects such as the Camp de Tarragona Petrochemical Complex, the Green Hydrogen Project and Catalina I in Andorra (Teruel), the geological hydrogen deposit in Monzón, the Basque Hydrogen Corridor and Besaya H2 in Torrelavega can generate.

The main effects detected by local organisations are related to the high consumption of water and renewable energy required for its production, as well as the prioritisation of spending on industrial mega-projects over investments on social sectors and community prorities.

In the case of the Andorra Green Hydrogen Project, where an old thermal power plant is located, Endesa plans to build a 15 MW electrolyser, accompanied by 1,800 MW of renewable energy plants and two battery storage plants. This project has been included in the Just Transition Plan, in an Autonomous Community, Aragon, which currently exports half of the electricity it produces.

In Chile, the main producer of green hydrogen in Latin America, the impacts of the projects are borne by the indigenous communities of Pueblo Chango, who see how the biodiversity of their coastline is affected by the desalination plants that aim to feed water to the green hydrogen projects that will be installed.

This was the result of fieldwork carried out by the ODG in northern Chile in November 2022 and by the ODG and Ecologistas en Acción in the Spanish state in December 2023.

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